Misschien ook hier interessant: RAF piloot, "lessen" aangaande de luchtvaart. Website

"The Normalisation of Deviance": How I Almost Destroyed a £50 million War Plane.

http://www.fastjetperformance.com/podcasts/how-i-almost-destroyed-a-50-million-war-plane-when-display-flying-goes-wrong-and-the-normalisation-of-deviance

Author

Tim Davies is a flying instructor on the Hawk T2 at RAF Valley and the Squadron Uncle.

This means that he is officially a dinosaur
who has been flying fast jets for far, far too long.

Read time... 20 mins but it's about you, it's always about you.

RECOVER!’ came the shout from the back seat of my Tornado GR4 combat jet but it wasn’t necessary - I had already started to yank back on the controls as hard as I could!

Our 25 tonne fuel laden bomber was now a treacherous 40 degrees nose down and shuddering madly as the airflow violently separated from the wing due to my impossible demands.

As we broke through the base of the cloud, my Head Up Display was suddenly filled with a sickening amount of earth and fields.

This was bad.

The Ground Proximity Warning System sounded.

‘WOOP, WOOP! - PULL UP, PULL UP!’

‘7, 6, 5 - that’s 400 ft Tim!’, called my Weapons Systems Officer. :eek:

We were well outside ejection seat parameters and we both knew it.

How had I got us into this mess?

Stop.

Yes, sometimes you just have to stop.

And that can be very hard indeed, especially when you have been doing something for so long that it has become routine.

...lees op
http://www.fastjetperformance.com/podcasts/how-i-almost-destroyed-a-50-million-war-plane-when-display-flying-goes-wrong-and-the-normalisation-of-deviance maar effe verder. Ja, gaat ook over die Gulfstream 4 crash in 2014.

The 'accident' involved a Gulfstream IV business jet that crashed in Bedford, Massachusetts in 2014 after the experienced crew attempted to takeoff with the gust-lock engaged.

The report's Executive Summary concluded that the probable cause was the crew's failure to perform a check of the flying control surfaces before take-off, their attempt to take-off with the gust-lock applied and their delayed actioning of the rejected take-off when they realised the controls were locked.

Contributing factors included the flight crews habitual non-compliance with checklists. In fact five checklists had not been completed and it had become standard practice within the organisation to not do them.

To people who fly professionally, however, it is obvious that the report implies that the accident was caused by a theory called the 'Normalisation of Deviance’.

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