FL410 is erg hoog. Onze company limit is FL370. Daarboven kunnen de oilseals vanwege de erg lage druk hun werk niet meer goed doen.
Dit is algemeen en ik heb natuurlijk geen idee of er een verband is met het ongeluk.

Overigens geloof ik dat twee jaar geleden bij Brest een CRJ200 tijdens de app is neergekomen. Daarbij is sowieso de capt omgekomen. Of er ook paxen zijn omgekomen weet ik nu niet zeker.

Klote ja, De Captain Jesse Rhodes was een kennis van me, en met de Co heb ik ook wel gevlogen, ze kwamen bijden van GA hier in Florida... beide motoren stonden in brand toen ze naar beneden kwamen.. Op het laatste moment de huizen op de grond weten te ontwijken.

werkelijk, een company rule die je verbied boven FL370 te vliegen? nooit van zo iets gehoort, zeker niet in verband met eventuele oilseals en lage druk... thanks for the input

for the record:
26jul93 C-FCRJ CRJ100 7001 Canadair
Het onderzoek naar de oorzaak van het verlies van het prototype van de Regional Jet heeft enkele niet correcte handelingen van de crew aan het licht gebracht. cut

add
16dec97 C-FSKI CRJ100ER 7068 Air Canada
Bij de landing op Fredericton kwam het toestel met één wiel in een sneeuwrand terecht waardoor het 180° omdraaide, van de baan raakte en uiteindelijk in een bosrand tot stilstand kwam. Alle 42 inzittenden raakten gewond, de meesten gelukkig niet ernstig. Enkele passagiers in het voorste gedeelte van het toestel waar enkele bomen waren binnen gedrongen raakten bekneld en moesten door de brandweer uit hun benarde positie worden bevrijd. cut

22jun03 F-GRJS CRJ100ER 7377 Brit' Air
Twee kilometer voor de landing op Brest-Guipevas verongelukte net voor middernacht deze Canadair Regional Jet van Brit’Air, die Air France-vlucht 5672 van Nantes naar Brest uitvoerde. Het toestel kwam voor de baan aan de grond, schoof tussen bomen door en kwam vijftig meter van een huis tot stilstand. Er brak brand uit, maar het lukte de inwonende van het huis niet om die met een brandblusser te doven. Gelukkig was de toegangsdeur door de klap verdwenen en konden alle 24 passagiers en twee van de bemanningsleden het wrak tijdig verlaten. De captain kwam echter om in de vlammen, ondanks pogingen hem te bevrijden. cut

quote van flightinfo:

"The media wasn't speculating. The article was quoting the NTSB spokesman, and their job involves a process of educated speculation to form avenues of investigation. All the NTSB guy said regarding the a/c being at FL410 was that "it was the most interesting thing". I'm sure that it's always noticed and they become interested (and it therefore becomes one of those avenues of investigation) if any accident a/c is operating at the limit of it's certified perf envelope just before things go wrong.

This would be especially true with regards to it's max alt certification with the seriously-degraded performance, and in the case of jets, the hostile environment to crew and systems you find there. They wouldn't be doing their jobs very well if they weren't keeping that in mind, even if it turns out not to be a factor.

He'd say that, because they are fully aware that 99% of CRJ/CFE-34 hours are flown at Flight Levels in the 20's and 30's. The fleet-wide, historical experience up at FL410 is very, very limited. The "personal testaments" we see here that the aircraft and engines "Do just fine" and is "Easily hand-flown" at FL410 notwithstanding, it's axiomatic that aircraft perform differently on different days depending on conditions, especially up there where increases in temps relative to ISA can degrade perf in a non-linear fashion, where turb and shear becomes a major concern, and where ultra-low SATs can do bad things to systems that don't manifest themselves at more comfortable ones. We don't know what the flight conditions were that night at FL410, or during the climb.

Frankly, it's unsupported speculation to declare the altitude issue isn't important just because it went there for certification or a few have done it once or twice, and somewhat irresponsible to imply that CRJs/CFE-34s routinely and happily do it. I only have a couple thousand hours in CRJs, far less than some of you here, granted, but in my experience (including many lightweight, mx-ferry flights) for all it's good points, the thing's a dog above FL350 anytime, and at any FL when it's ISA+8 or higher. There's just no getting around the fact that it wasn't designed as a high-altitude performer, so it's rarely operated at it's certified limit.

All that being said, you can be sure they are going through all the systems, the mx procedures performed not just prior to the flight (most likely THE biggest thing they are "interested in"), but anything engine/fuel system related as far back as they can find. No doubt they descended on the last fuel farm/truck they used looking for contaminants. And like it or not, they're looking at the crew and their performance in a detached way that's hard for us to do here, since they were our brothers.

We can sit here and run through every possiblilty and yet they might find something completely out of the blue, like those guys were unlucky enough to have ingested the world's highest flying flock of geese unseen in the dark, or they took a one-in-a-billion meteor strike in the tail. Or someone that's happened too many times before with a/c just out of mx; a wrench forgotton in the wrong place, cannon plugs not secured, something not safety wired. We just don't know yet.

If anything, this terrible loss has already provoked discussions about things (which may have not played a role in this accident's cause) we might have become complacent on, or never known, because they ARE the speculative "what-if's". Such discussions are usually beneficial, they're normal, and they DON'T do a disservice to the crew and process, or feed a Rumor Mill, if they remain thoughtful. Case in point; someone has brought up the limited training crews at a lot regional airlines receive in high-altitude flight, which even if it wasn't a factor here, focuses our thoughts about what our own training and limitations might be. Same thing when someone else pointed to his thoughts of taking an aircraft just out of mx.

It's all food for thought, and up until the point someone without the facts begins pretending to know what happened or assigning blame in this accident whether that be to crew, mx, handlers, or even mngmt, such focus and the exchange of even tangental info can serve a good purpose, or at least a reminder in the face of a tragic event."
----

10 pages leesvoer hierover..

http://forums.flightinfo.com/showthread.php?t=41254

Posts: 673
Joined: Mar. 2002 Posted: Oct. 20 2004,19:57

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

October 20, 2004

************************************************************

UPDATE ON PINNACLE AIRLINES CRASH IN JEFFERSON CITY,
MISSOURI

************************************************************

Washington, D.C. -- The National Transportation Safety Board
today released the following update on its investigation of
the October 14, 2004 crash of Pinnacle Airlines flight 3701
in a residential area in Jefferson City, Missouri, about
three miles south of the Jefferson City, Missouri, airport.
The crash resulted in the deaths of the two crewmen. The
airplane was destroyed by the impact forces and a post crash
fire. There were no passengers onboard, nor were there any
injuries on the ground.

On October 14, 2004, the aircraft departed Little Rock,
Arkansas about 9:21 p.m. (CDT), on a repositioning flight
en-route to Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota.

Air Traffic Control
At about 9:43 p.m., the flight crew checked in with Kansas
City Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and indicated
that they were climbing to 41,000 feet. At approximately
9:52 p.m., the flight crew acknowledged that they were at
41,000 feet. At about 9:54 p.m., the flight crew asked for
a lower altitude. At about 9:55 p.m. the flight crew
declared an emergency. At about 9:59 p.m. the flight crew
requested an altitude of 13,000 feet. At about 10:03 p.m.,
the flight crew reported that they had experienced an engine
failure at 41,000. At 10:08 p.m., the flight crew stated
that they had a double engine failure and that they wanted a
direct route to any airport (According to the Flight Data
Recorder both engines stopped operating almost
simultaneously at 41,000 feet.) Kansas City ARTCC directed
the flight to Jefferson City Missouri Airport. At about
10:13 p.m., the flight crew stated that they had the runway
approach end in sight. The last radar contact for the
flight was at 900 feet above ground. The plane crashed at
about 10:15 p.m.

Maintenance
On October 14, the day of the accident, the airplane
underwent maintenance to replace the 14th stage bleed air-
sensing loop on the right engine. During a scheduled 7:45
a.m. departure from Little Rock, Arkansas to Minneapolis
St.-Paul, Missouri, an Indicating Crew Alerting System
(ICAS) message stating "R 14th duct" occurred during take-
off and the flight crew (not the accident crew) aborted the
take-off and returned to the gate. The 21 passengers were
deplaned. The airplane never left the ground.
Two mechanics from Pinnacle's Memphis, Tennessee facility
did the repair. During a Safety Board interview on
Saturday, the mechanics stated that they only replaced the
No. 2 (right) engine's 14th stage bleed air sensing loop.
The mechanics completed the repair and tested the system.
The aircraft was released for flight. On-scene evidence
confirms that the repair was done in accordance with the
Aircraft Maintenance Manual.

The aircraft was equipped with two GE CF34-3B1 engines. The
right engine had accumulated 2,303 hours and 1,971 cycles
since new. It was installed new on the aircraft on October
23, 2003. The left hand engine had 8,856 hours and 8,480
cycles since new. It was removed from another aircraft on
October 30, 2003 and installed on the accident aircraft on
April 6, 2004. Maintenance records indicate that during an
A4 check on June 9, 2004, the left engine igniters were
replaced. During an A5 check on August 18, 2004, the right
engine igniters were replaced. The most recent check was
the A5 check performed on August 18, 2004.

Operations
The Operations group traveled to Memphis to interview pilots
who had flown with the two crew members and to interview
some of the airlines training personnel and managers. There
are 10 to 12 interviews scheduled.

Wreckage
On-scene examination of the wreckage shows there was no sign
of an in-flight fire on the structure of the aircraft. The
airplane was found inverted and separated in several
sections. All four major flight surfaces were found at the
main wreckage site. The cockpit area was severely damaged
by the post crash fire.

During the Safety Board's examination of the engines, it was
noted that there was some thermal damage to the No. 2 engine
and that will be further looked at during a teardown in
Lynn, Mass. The engines will be shipped out today.

The wreckage is being shipped to Rantoul, Kansas.

Since the accident, the operator, Pinnacle Airlines, has
placed a new company altitude restriction on the flight
ceiling for their CL600-2B19s of 37,000 feet.

Parties to the investigation are Pinnacle Airlines, Federal
Aviation Administration, Air Line Pilot's Association,
National Air Traffic Controller's Association, and General
Electric (GE). The Transportation Safety Board of Canada
has sent an accredited representative along with technical
advisors from Transport Canada, the agency that certified
the aircraft, and Bombardier Aerospace, the manufacture of
the aircraft.

###

NTSB Media Contact: Terry N. Williams ([email protected])

Second NTSB Update

Second NTSB Update

Second NTSB Update On The Pinnacle Airlines Crash

Aircraft Apparently Entered Stall At 41,000 Feet
The National Transportation Safety Board Wednesday released the following
update on its investigation of the October 14, 2004 crash of Pinnacle
Airlines flight 3701 in a residential area in Jefferson City (MO). The two
crewmembers, who were the only occupants on board, were killed, and impact
forces and a postcrash fire destroyed the airplane. There were no injuries
on the ground. The on-scene portion of the investigation finished on October
20, 2004.

The two GE CF34-3B1 engines were shipped to a General Electric Aircraft
Engine facility in Lynn, Massachusetts for detailed examination. The
examination found that the cores of both engines were free to rotate and
there was no indication of any pre-existing problems that would have led to
the accident.

The flight data recorder (FDR) data indicate that while the airplane was at
41,000 feet, the stick shaker and stick pusher activated several times
before the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall. Almost simultaneously,
both engines shut down. The air-driven generator was automatically deployed
and supplied the backup alternating current power to the airplane.

According to the emergency checklist for a dual engine failure, there are
two ways to restart or relight the engines. One option is to use a windmill
restart, which requires at least 300 knots indicated airspeed and the core
of the engine to be either 12 percent rpm above 15,000 feet or 9 percent rpm
below 15,000 feet. The FDR data show that the computed airspeed did not get
above 300 knots and that there was no measured rotation of the engine core.

The second option is to use auxiliary power unit (APU) bleed air, which has
to be accomplished at 13,000 feet or below. The target best glide speed
depends on the weight of the aircraft and is either 190 knots indicated
airspeed or 170 knots indicated airspeed. The FDR data indicate that the APU
was on after the aerodynamic stall and that the airspeed was sufficient for
an APU start. The FDR and CVR indicated that the flight crew tried to start
the engines several times but were unsuccessful.

The operations group is still conducting interviews and developing the
72-hour history for the flight crew. The operations group has scheduled
interviews with the Federal Aviation Administration principal operations
inspector and several managers for the operator. The systems, powerplants,
and aircraft performance will visit the airplane manufacturer.

Chilling...........

Chilling...........

Jefferson City Plane Crash: Pilots Were Having "A Little Fun"
POSTED: Saturday, March 05, 2005 3:47:09 PM
UPDATED: Saturday, March 05, 2005 4:29:56 PM
ST. LOUIS -- Moments before a double engine failure and a crash that killed them, one of the pilots aboard a regional airliner told an air traffic controller they had "decided to have a little fun" by flying at the plane's maximum altitude.

There were no passengers on the plane and no one on the ground was injured by the Oct. 14 crash in a residential neighborhood of Jefferson City, Mo.

Transcripts the St. Louis Post-Dispatch obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration describe the rapid descent of the Pinnacle Airlines Corp. plane after it lost engine power.

The problem was first mentioned in the transcripts when an air traffic controller in Kansas City told the pilots it was rare to see the plane, a Canadair CRJ2, flying at an altitude of 41,000 feet.

"Yeah, we're actually ... we don't have any passengers on board, so we decided to have a little fun and come up here," one of the pilots said. The transcripts don't identify whether Capt. Jesse Rhodes or First Officer Richard Peter Cesarz made the statement.

The pilot soon told air traffic controllers that the CRJ2 wouldn't remain at that altitude for long.

"I don't think he had enough gas up there; he was so slow," one air traffic controller said.

The pilots said first one and then the second engine shut down.

"We're going to need a little lower to start this other engine up, so we're going to go down to about 12 or 11 (thousand feet). Is that cool?" the pilot said.

The last contact that controllers had with the crew was at 9,000 feet, when the pilot reported an airport beacon in sight.

Earlier that day, the crew had called off a scheduled flight with passengers from Little Rock, Ark., because an indicator light went on for part of its "bleed air" system, which takes hot, compressed air from the engines to heat other components of the plane. After a repair, the plane took off for Minneapolis with just the crew on board.

Phil Reed, Pinnacle's vice president of marketing, said he could not comment.

Trieste zaak allemaal natuurlijk...

Puur voor de statistieken...er is onlangs ook een CRJ in china op de klep gegaan na de start...50 doden..zou met het niet de-icen hebben te maken gehad...

Ook wij hebben een restrictie op de max.altitude van 37000 feeters voor de CRJ 1 en 2. Dit vanwege het mogelijke schuimen van de olie. We hebben de pompen niet die dit tegengaan.

Overigens vind ik 37000 net zo hostile als 41000. Dus ben ik niet helemaal eens met die amerikaanse schrijver.

Erg speculatief...maar het lijkt erop dat die gasten eerst inde stall zijn gekomen en pas daarna de flame-outs (dit dan weer vanwege de verstoorde lucht aanstroming in de motoren). Wilden ze iets uitproberen?

Vlak voor de glijlanding zijn ze wederom gestalled en inverted op de grond geklapt.brrrrrrrrr

Van een collega.. Hoop niet dat het waar is eigenlijk..

"I talked to a CRJ check airman who had been briefed on the CVR contents. The crew never pulled out a checklist during the entire episode. They kept trying to restart the engines outside the restart envelope and toasted both engines."

NTSB hearing, 13-14-15 June 2005, eerste dag.

Pilots in Mo. Jet Crash Wanted to Have Fun

Monday June 13, 2005 4:31 PM

By LESLIE MILLER

Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - Two pilots, in a jovial mood as they flew an empty commuter jet, wanted to ``have a little fun'' by taking the plane to an unusually high altitude last October, only to realize as the engines failed that they were not going to make it, according to transcripts released Monday.

The plane, which the two were ferrying from Little Rock, Ark. to Minneapolis, crashed and both Capt. Jesse Rhodes and First Officer Peter Cesarz perished.

The cockpit voice recording, released by the National Transportation Safety Board at the start of a three-day hearing into the Oct. 14, 2004 accident, revealed how the pilots cracked jokes and decided to ``have a little fun'' and fly to 41,000 feet - the maximum altitude for their plane. Most commuter jets fly at lower altitudes.

``Man, we can do it, 41-it,'' said Cesarz at 9:48 p.m. A minute later, Rhodes said, ``40 thousand, baby.''

Two minutes later, ``There's 41-0, my man,'' Cesarz said. ``Made it, man.''

At 9:52 p.m., one of the pilots popped a can of Pepsi and they joked about drinking beer. A minute later, Cesarz said, ``This is the greatest thing, no way.''

But at 10:03 p.m., the pilots reported their engine had failed. Five minutes later, they said both engines had failed and they wanted a direct route to any airport.

The transcript recounts their increasingly desperate efforts to restart the engines and regain altitude. They tried to land at the Jefferson City, Mo., airport but by 10:14 p.m., it was obvious they wouldn't reach it.

``We're not going to make it, man. We're not going to make it,'' Cesarz said. The plane crashed in a residential neighborhood of Jefferson City. No one was injured on the ground.

Accident investigators are examining how well the pilots were trained - a key safety question as the number of regional jets keeps growing.

The crash involved a Bombardier regional jet plane operated by Pinnacle Airlines, an affiliate of Northwest Airlines. Like many regional carriers, Pinnacle is growing rapidly as it teams up with a traditional network airline looking to offer more seats to more places.

Memphis, Tenn.-based Pinnacle grew by 700 percent in the past five years, according to Phil Reed, its marketing vice president. During that time, it switched its fleet from propeller-driven planes to small turbojets, known as regional jets, or RJs.

The number of regional jets rose to 1,630 last year from 570 in 2000, the Federal Aviation Administration says. The question of whether government safety inspectors can keep up with such rapid changes in the airline industry was raised last week in a Transportation Department inspector general's report.

Jet engines work differently at higher altitudes, and it's unclear whether the relatively inexperienced Pinnacle pilots were aware that they had to be more careful in the thin air at 41,000 feet, the maximum altitude for their plane.

According to FAA transcripts of air-to-ground conversations, an air traffic controller in Kansas City told the two pilots it was rare to see the plane flying that high.

``Yeah, we're actually ... we don't have any passengers on board, so we decided to have a little fun and come up here,'' one of the pilots said. The transcripts don't identify whether Jesse Rhodes or Cesarz made the statement.

First one, then the other engine shut down. The last contact that controllers had with the crew was at 9,000 feet, when the pilot reported an airport beacon in sight.

At the hearing, NTSB investigators plan to delve into the plane's flight limits and the proper recovery techniques when engines fail. They also want to know if the pilots knew those procedures and to learn the engine's performance characteristics at high altitudes.

On June 2, the FAA issued a special bulletin clarifying what steps pilots need to take to restart an engine when there's a dual engine failure, agency spokeswoman Laura Brown said.

David Stempler, president of the Air Travelers Association, said the issue may be reckless pilots rather than inadequate training or improper recovery procedures.

``This is more a story of pilots having time on their hands and playing with things in the cockpit that they shouldn't,'' he said.

Flying, he said, is as boring as truck driving most of the time.

``This was boredom and experimentation, these guys experimenting with things they had no business doing,'' Stempler said.

vandaag en morgen gaat het verder. Te volgen op NTSB website.

Not so cheerfull
Art

"David Stempler, president of the Air Travelers Association, said the issue may be reckless pilots rather than inadequate training or improper recovery procedures."

Hmm, kunnen transport piloten even wat toelichting geven?
Als de vrachtwagen chauffeur links mag rijden en dat wil, dan doet hij dat als het geen gevaar oplevert.

Als ik als PPL VFR vlieg en ik vind het op FL130 leuker dan op 1000 ft, dan doe ik dat.

Hoe zit dit bij commerciaal transport? Mag je dit "voor de lol" doen, mits je binnen alle limieten vliegt? Het schijnt hier te zijn dat ze onder of op de limiet zaten.

Het restarten daargelaten. Hoe strikt zijn SOPs normaal?

Wel een goede zaak dat de FAA hier een prinicpieel onderzoke naar gaat doen, met de enorme expansie.

Ja je mag het voor de "lol" doen.

re sops: nu mogen ze niet meer boven FL370 komen door dit incident.

Tevens (uit ervaring) is er qua aanname beleid enorm veel veranderd bij Pinnacle.. Vroeger was het een kopje thee en een ATP written. Nu bestaat het uit een ATP written, high altitude aerodynamics (dutch roll, covn corner, crtit aoa etc etc), sim en 3 on 1 interview (3 uur)... Van de 10 sollicitanten nemen ze er ongeveer 2 per dag aan.

De NTSB en mama Northwest zitten ze flink in de nek te hijgen.

Verder een prima maatschappij! zit volgende week in het hoofdgebouw in Memphis en men heeft het er nogsteeds bijna dagelijks over daar.. Zeker na het vrijkomen van deze rapporten..

En als je wilt zien hoe de yanks er over denken.. oh well...

http://forums.flightinfo.com/showthread.php?t=56097
http://forums.flightinfo.com/showthread.php?t=56093

FL 410 is (was) de max certified FL voor de CRJ. Nu hebben ze dat gelimiteerd tot FL370. Deze twee vliegers hebben dus geen regels overtreden ivm de FL (ondanks dat een krantenartikel zei dat vliegers bij Pinnacle niet mogen afwijken van de hoogte die dispatch op het flightplan heeft gezet - wat doen ze als het turbulent is, er icing conditions zijn etc?). Het probleem was dat ze de kist in een stall hebben laten komen wat dus een dubbele flame-out veroorzaakte. De marge tussen stall en barberpole op FL 410 is ook heel klein, en een kleine snelheids afwijking op die hoogte kan dus grote gevolgen hebben. Waarom ze niet een van de motoren hebben kunnen herstarten op lagere hoogte? geen idee.

alleen deze, en een aantal andere, maatschappijen hebben de CRJ gelimiteerd tot FL370 dmv SOP

het lijkt inmiddels dat tijdens de stall en de flame out de motoren een "core lock" kregen (simpele versie is dat de sterk afkoelende HPT rotor en stators krimpen en de boel loopt dan vast), had daar eerlijk gezegd ook nog nooit van gehoord, weer wat geleerd

zoals in diverse forums al naar voren is gekomen, de CRJ200 variant vliegt prima op FL410 (mits je weet wat je doet, niet te zwaar bent en de ISA niet te ongunstig is) het apparaat vliegt dan behoorlijk zuinig (ff minder 2000 pph, sfc met een beetje tailwind .25 lbs/nm!)

nog een lesson learned, ik wist niet (tot een tijdje terug) dat de FMS N1 in de CRJ200 boven FL360 niet betrouwbaar is maar je een reference tabel gebruikt uit de QRH (die een iets hogere waarde geeft aan de hand van de temparatuur, dus meer perf/speed in cruise)

any comments van CRJ vliegers?

Tsja.. vind het ook niet vreemd dat je sinds kort tijdens je interview daar mag uitleggen wat coffin corner is..

All the best gents.
FD

CRJ200 Flameout Crash Spawns Lawsuit

CRJ200 Flameout Crash Spawns Lawsuit

Former DOT Inspector General Mary Schiavo’s law firm, Motley Rice LLC, has filed suit against Bombardier, General Electric, Honeywell, Northwest Airlines, KGS Electronics and Parker Hannifin on behalf of the families of the pilots who died in the crash of a Pinnacle Airlines Bombardier CRJ200 on Oct. 14, 2004, near Jefferson City, Mo. While on a repositioning flight to Minneapolis, captain Jesse Rhodes and first officer Richard Cesarz took the 50-seat CRJ to its service ceiling of 41,000 feet to, in the words of the captain, “have a little fun.” Moments later the airplane’s GE CF34-3B turbofans quit and failed to restart. The post-crash investigation revealed conditions consistent with engine core lock. Motley Rice charges that the defendants knew of the potential for core lock and subsequent oil pump malfunction, faulty restart instructions and other alleged problems with the aircraft. The NTSB has yet to issue a final report, but information from the FDR and CVR indicated that the pilots changed seats, ignored stick-shaker warnings, failed to declare an emergency immediately and waited too long to request a vector to an alternate airport.

JO,

typisch amerikaans.. gelijk naar de rechtbank, als ik de ouder van die vliegers zou ik me doodschamen..

wil je lol in de luchtvaart doe het dan niet met de machine van je baas, huur een pits, extra etc en heb je lol.
je baas betaald je genoeg om lekker veel saaie, nil further vluchten te hebben 30 jaar lang!!

de 747 is gecertificeerd tot FL450 en het hoogste waar ik gezeten heb is FL430 om over een jetstream te komen boven japan. en dat was 1 malig bij hoge uitzondering. door de ijle lucht heeft de AP het er moeilijk mee, en de AT moest uit vanwege het najagen van de speed. maw, moest werken voor mn geld, zodra we naar beneden konden zijn we gewoon lekker naar FL370 gegaan. waar de classic zich veel beter voelt. en de TAS weer lekker omhoog gaat.

las ook weer een ander interesant incident die 747 die in heathrow is geland,
las in het boeing bullitin dat die vlieger dacht dat je in de 747 N-1 360kts kan vliegen op FL240...

@FD,

jammer dat je maatschappij nu pas realiseert dat je voor High altitude wat training nodig hebt. voor mij zelf is elke hoogte boven de FL 150 hoog!!! en kan potentieel gevaarlijk zijn..

succes in ieder geval.

Tsja werken voor mn geld ben ik ook geen fan van. Zie ook echt trouwens het verschil niet tussen 370 en FL410.. Uitzicht is het zelefde.

Volgende keer dat je lol wilt hebben raad ik een T-34 aan by the way....

FD

maar daar knakken de vleugels zo nu en dan van af....

die ouders hebben zich natuurlijk rijk laten rekenen door een gluiperd van advocaat, die arme mensen staan straks in hun hempje en voor schut als de advocaat van de tegen partij hun zonen (terecht helaas) uitmaakt voor sukkels

Inderdaad. Als ik zo dat rapport is doorlees, dan staan beide zonen daar inderdaad erg slecht voor.

Ik wil niemand beschuldigen, en al helemaal niet beledigen of in een slecht licht stellen, maar je zou bijna denken dat er hier en daar een druppeltje alchohol in 't spel geweest is. Dat of een flink zuurstof-tekort. En om dat alles nu op elke producent van om 't even welk schroefje van 't vliegtuig te schuiven, is erg driest.